Working Papers
Breaking Bad Sorting, 2026.
with Han Ng, and Jia Xiang
- Abstract: We investigate how consumer sorting contributes to outcome differences and its implications for expert-targeted policies. Using employer-sponsored insurance claims on opioid prescribing for chronic pain, we show that patient sorting explains more than twice as much of the prescribing variation as physicians’ prescribing propensity, and stems almost entirely from preferences exceeding CDC guidelines, which we term “bad sorting.” We develop and estimate an equilibrium model of patients’ physician choice and physicians’ prescribing. Counterfactuals show that patient resorting attenuates the effects of policies targeting top prescribers. We propose expert-targeted policies that break bad sorting, eliminating sorting on preferences exceeding guidelines while preserving care for patients with clinical needs.
Optimal Estimation of Discrete Choice Demand Models with Consumer and Product Data, 2025.
with Paul Grieco, Charles Murry, and Joris Pinkse
Revisions requested at Econometrica
- We propose a likelihood-based estimator with exogeneity restrictions for BLP-type demand models combining microdata, product shares, and prices.
- Our estimator is implemented in the easy-to-use companion Julia package Grumps.jl. Install it by typing
using Pkg; Pkg.add("Grumps") in the Julia REPL. - previously circulated as Conformant and Efficient Estimation of Discrete Choice Demand Models
Dispersion, Discrimination, and the Price of Your Pickup, 2024.
- Abstract: Using repeat purchase data on pickup trucks, I establish that the same consumers pay persistently high or persistently low prices across vehicle purchases. Less than 1% of this persistence can be explained by demographics. This result suggests that dealers use consumer information beyond coarse demographics to personalize prices. Using a novel discrete choice model with personalized pricing, I study the role of consumer information firms use for pricing in the welfare effects of price discrimination. To do so, I overcome a common problem in settings with transaction data: personalized prices of non-chosen alternatives are unobservable. I solve this problem by recovering unobserved personalized prices and consumer-specific price sensitivity from the observed transaction price via firms’ first-order conditions. I simulate two counterfactuals: uniform pricing and price discrimination based on coarse demographic groups. Compared to uniform pricing, personalized pricing increases profits and total welfare but, on average, harms consumers. On the other hand, compared to uniform pricing, price discrimination based only on demographics is not profitable. This highlights the importance of the amount of consumer information firms can use for pricing in the welfare effects of price discrimination.